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ABSTRACT

This paper outlines the danger of continuing the conventional and nuclear arms races and offers alternatives to ensure both peace and security. There are five major sections to the paper. In the first section, "Mulitlateral Approach," global multilateral accomplishments, regional multilateral activities, and bilateral negotiations are discussed. Section two deals with the "Second Special Session on Disarmament" (SSOD II). The opportunities and hazards facing SSOD II and specific recommendations to stimulate progress are explored. "Multilateral Disarmament Measures" is the topic of the third section. Included is a discussion of strategic nuclear arms control, the comprehensive nuclear test ban, the International Atomic Energy Agency, treaties, conventional arms reduction, outer space, regional arrangements, and confidence-building measures. The fourth section discusses obstacles to multilateral disarmament such as tradition, myths, limited approach, low priority, lack of disarmament organizations, inadequate constituency, and lack of leadership. The concluding section points out some hopeful signs. For example, economic pressures to reduce military expenditures are mounting. A second hopeful omen is the growing realization of what technology has wrought: mind-boggling weapons which, if used, would ravage modern civilization and threaten human survival. (RM)

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Multilateral Disarmament: Conspiracy for Common Sense

C. Maxwell Stanley

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About the Author

C. Maxwell Stanley is recognized at home and abroad as an accomplished professional engineer, business executive, author, civic leader, and world citizen. As president of the Stanley Foundation, Mr. Stanley has chaired numerous conferences dealing with international issues. The majority of these conferences dealt with some aspect of multilateral disarmament. Six dealt specifically with the UN's special sessions on disarmament. He has addressed both the UN First Special Session on Disarmament and the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session, and he serves as a leader in a number of organizations dedicated to the advancement of world peace.

Mr. Stanley is founder and now chairman of the board of both Stanley Consultants, Inc. and HON Industries. He is the author of *Waging Peace* (1956), *The Consulting Engineer* (1961, Second Edition, 1982), and *Managing Global Problems* (1979).

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Multilateral Disarmament: Conspiracy for Common Sense

The time for disarmament has come. Without it, the world is courting the tragedy of a major war and the ultimate disaster of nuclear holocaust. Reduction of national arms is a crucial first step for replacing the world's continuing reliance on military power. The old and traditional practice of threatening and using military might to assure peace and security has outlived its usefulness. War is obsolete. Technology and economics have succeeded where logic and morality have failed. The world's leaders must come to their senses, resist the flawed advice of militarists advocating evermore deadly and costly weapons, and get serious about limiting and reducing national armaments. Disarmament is an essential prerequisite to achieving the goal of a world without war.

Public support for disarmament was strong at the close of World War II. The bombed-out ruins of the cities of both victorious and defeated nations stood as mute testimony to the destructiveness of the era's conventional weapons. The obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the first primitive atom bombs marked a quantum leap in weapon power. World War II's enormous toll of human life and suffering—civilian as well as combatant—strengthened determination to reduce armaments and thereby to lessen the probability of another catastrophic world war.

Now, three and a half decades later, the urgency to disarm is even greater because the world is "armed to the teeth." The Hiroshima and Nagasaki atom bombs were but firecrackers compared to the nuclear warheads of today. Conventional weapons have become vastly more destructive, sophisticated, and costly. Military establishments burgeon in countries large and small, prosperous and poverty-stricken. The military establishments of the world annually absorb some $600 billion (US), money sorely needed for critical nonmilitary purposes. Despite this gigantic arms buildup, few nations feel secure. In the interests of security and at the behest of military leaders, modern technology has developed weaponry capable of destroying civilization. The urgency of the current situation was well stated in the Final Document of the UN General Assembly's First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD I) in 1978:

Mankind is confronted with a choice. We must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

Multilateral Approach

For 35 years, I have watched the world's futile efforts to control, limit, and reduce national armaments. During most of these years, I have endeavored, both personally and with others in various organizations including the Stanley Foundation, to aid and abet disarmament progress.

Although bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit strategic nuclear forces have received the most publicity, multilateral disarmament efforts have been on the global agenda since World War II. Global and regional multilateral activities are the subject of this paper. Bilateral disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are discussed only as they relate to multilateral activities. Security discussions between other pairs of countries are generally concerned with nonaggression pacts and seldom involve agreements on arms limitation or reduction.

The multilateral disarmament approach is important for two reasons: First, it provides an opportunity for accomplishment; indeed most disarmament measures must be multilateral. Second, the multilateral approach stimulates interest and concern about disarmament, improves the climate for disarmament, and serves as a prod to the two major nuclear powers to get on with bilateral negotiations.

The history of multilateral disarmament is more one of frustration than of stirring successes, although significant beginnings have been made. My emphasis in this paper is not on what has happened in the past but rather on the potential for multilateral disarmament, the obstacles to disarmament progress, and the need to develop national will and national leadership to carry forward the disarmament movement.

Global Multilateral Accomplishments

Since World War II, the United Nations has provided the mechanisms for global multilateral disarmament activity. The General Assembly has repeatedly debated and adopted disarmament resolutions. These nonenforceable resolutions

have kept the disarmament concept alive by advancing ideas, educating member states' representatives, and contributing to the consensus-building process. Some resolutions have pointed the way to later treaties. For example, the Irish proposal for a nonproliferation agreement was adopted by the General Assembly in 1959, nine years before the Non-Proliferation Treaty was adopted. The UN Disarmament Commission, created by the General Assembly, has also adopted resolutions urging action.

In 1962, the Geneva-based Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), originally called the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, was established to negotiate treaties. The CCD, composed initially of 18 and later of 31 nations, was related to the United Nations but was not actually a UN organization. The United States and the Soviet Union urged establishment of the CCD because they were dissatisfied with the manner in which the UN General Assembly was dealing with disarmament. The CCD was created soon after the Soviet Union and the United States each made proposals for general and complete disarmament. Their proposals were based on disarmament principles agreed to by John L. McCloy of the United States and Valerian Alexandrovitch Zorin of the Soviet Union. For a time, the CCD discussed the comprehensive approach to disarmament, but by 1963 this concept was dropped and attention was given to arms control. The CCD negotiated the following treaties and recommended them to the General Assembly for adoption and subsequent ratification by member states. Treaties adopted by the General Assembly include:

1. Antarctica Treaty (1959).
2. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water (1963).
3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1967).
4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968).
5. Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971).
6. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972).

7. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977).

These seven treaties are now in force.

SSOD I may well have been a turning point in UN multilateral disarmament activities. The world community, urged by the nonaligned nations, was becoming increasingly unhappy with the domination of the CCD and other disarmament efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union and with their failure to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. SSOD I was an attempt to strengthen the determination of member states to deal with disarmament and to improve UN disarmament machinery.

SSOD I, the largest and highest level disarmament conference ever convened, focused the attention of more nations on disarmament issues. Its Final Document dealt with numerous near-term facets of both nuclear and conventional disarmament and established general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the long-range objective. Significant changes in the UN disarmament machinery occurred as a result of SSOD I.

The Final Document states:

> The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field, and in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures—unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral—and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

To ensure a more central role in disarmament for the United Nations, the Final Document:

1. Reaffirmed the General Assembly as the main UN deliberative body.

2. Limited the agenda of the First Committee to "questions of disarmament and related international security measures."

3. Revived the dormant UN Disarmament Commission "to consider and recommend on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the Special Session" with emphasis on a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament (CPD).

4. Requested the Secretary-General to furnish expert staff and services to the commission.

5. Called for a Second Special Session on Disarmament at a date to be set by the Thirty-Third Session of the General Assembly.

In accordance with SSOD I recommendations, the CCD was transformed into a 40-nation Committee on Disarmament (CD) with a revolving chairmanship and closer liaison with the General Assembly. This change lessened the former influence of the two nuclear giants and encouraged participation by France and China in the CD. Liaison with the General Assembly is maintained through a Secretary of the Committee appointed by the Secretary-General.

SSOD I also requested the Secretary-General to set up an Advisory Board and to undertake special disarmament studies. It urged strengthening of the UN Centre for Disarmament, established a UN Institute for Disarmament Research, and initiated a UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament. The Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II) is to be convened in June 1982.

Despite these encouraging developments, not a plane, not a tank, nor a ship has been deactivated. The only substantive multilateral achievements since SSOD I have been agreement on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects and the drafting of the main elements of a radiological weapons treaty.

Regional Multilateral Activities

Not all multilateral disarmament efforts are global. In 1969,

the Latin American nations perfected the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and established the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America as a control mechanism. By means of protocols, nuclear weapon states outside the area covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty agree—or will agree when France ratifies Protocol No. 1—to respect the terms of the treaty and to refrain from testing, producing, storing, or using nuclear weapons in Latin America and from the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty.

The Tlatelolco Treaty points the way to other nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and perhaps zones of limited conventional weapons. In 1972, eight Latin American countries adopted the Declaration of Ayacucho proposing to limit and reduce conventional arms; further discussions were held in 1978 and 1979. A zone of peace in the Indian Ocean has been proposed, however, so far this proposal has been aborted by US-Soviet opposition.

The long-standing Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) negotiations between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations is another regional disarmament effort. The objective of these Vienna-based talks is to reduce opposing forces in Europe. While significant progress has been made, key issues remain.

Other proposals regarding European disarmament were made at the recent Madrid conference, which assessed the Helsinki Accords established by the 1976 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Unfortunately, all European multilateral disarmament efforts are stymied by the Soviet-US confrontation that has been intensified by the events in Poland, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and by the US posture and military build-up.

Despite limited success, regional multilateral disarmament approaches are important and promising. They are more manageable than global efforts because fewer states are involved and the states are likely to have a greater commonality of interests, culture, and language. Also regions can often be somewhat isolated from external entanglements and pressures.

Bilateral Negotiations

For two decades, the world community was tolerably agree-

able to place primary responsibility for arms reduction on the United States and the Soviet Union. Other nations and the United Nations urged them to get on with limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. The increasing emphasis on multilateral disarmament approaches results from a growing recognition that disarmament is too important to be left to the nuclear powers. Nevertheless, the status of Soviet-US negotiations has a three-fold impact on the likely success of multilateral efforts.

First, Soviet-US negotiations strongly influence the climate of all serious disarmament efforts. The current situation, more accurately described as a deadlock rather than a confrontation, creates a very unfavorable atmosphere. The fabric of strategic detente is raveling; SALT II has been discarded and successor talks—perhaps to be called Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)—have not begun. Discussion of ways to avoid weaponization of outer space is dormant; talks on theater nuclear weapons in Europe are fruitless so far; the United States has embarked on a major expansion of military power—an expansion sure to be matched by the Soviet Union; and both nations are taking a hard line, intensified by polemic rhetoric. While multilateral disarmament efforts are not solely dependent on superpower relations, the current impasse between the Soviet Union and the United States inevitably handicaps multilateral efforts.

Second, the success of multilateral disarmament efforts is directly affected by US-Soviet participation. US-Soviet attitudes and activities in the forthcoming SSOD II will certainly influence the recommendations contained in the Final Document. The Final Document is not a treaty, therefore the willingness of the United States and Soviet Union to implement its recommendations will, to a considerable degree, affect the success of SSOD II.

Third, both major nuclear powers, as members of the CD, influence the multilateral treaties and recommendations the CD negotiates and submits to the General Assembly. Most of the multilateral treaties which have been adopted by the General Assembly have been the outgrowth of initial bilateral negotiations between the two countries. To some extent, this need may continue, particularly on treaties related to strategic nuclear weapons.

Thus, while the United States and Soviet Union cannot control multilateral disarmament activities, they will influence them for the better or worse. Nothing, *but nothing*, would be more beneficial to the multilateral disarmament effort than an improved US-Soviet relationship. The world impatiently awaits the example and leadership of the Soviet Union and the United States; they hold the key to nuclear disarmament and, in a way, to all disarmament progress.

Second Special Session on Disarmament

When SSOD II convenes the Assembly will probably adopt the agenda developed by its Preparatory Committee. If so, following general debate, the session will endeavor to:

—Review the implementation of decisions and recommendations of SSOD I.
—Consider and adopt a CPD.
—Implement the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.
—Consider initiatives and proposals of member states.
—Enhance the effectiveness of disarmament machinery, including the possible convening of a world disarmament conference.
—Mobilize world public opinion in favor of disarmament.

SSOD II offers an opportunity for the nations of the world to break through present barriers and to stimulate disarmament progress, but it will only be a success if it advances beyond SSOD I. Neither a repetition of the debate of SSOD I nor a restatement of the Final Document will be viewed as progress. SSOD II will be judged by how it strengthens the determination and capability of the disarmament community and sets the stage for progress on specific high-priority disarmament measures. Action, not rhetoric, is called for.

What accomplishments may reasonably be expected of SSOD II, given the tense international situation and the East-West stalemate? Based on years of observation and study of multilateral disarmament efforts including formal and informal discussions at Stanley Foundation conferences, I offer a few comments. While the opportunity for SSOD II is great, the risk of failure is high. I foresee several potential hazards that must be avoided. Care must be taken that a tone of recrimination against the major nuclear powers—however

warranted it might be--does not develop at the expense of constructive attention to multilateral disarmament needs and opportunities. The temptation to settle for reviewing and rewriting the Final Document of SSOD I rather than setting the stage for a strengthened disarmament community and early and constructive action must be resisted.

It is expected that the CPD now being formulated in Geneva by a working committee of the CD at the request of the Disarmament Commission will be a major focus of deliberation. Many view the CPD as the centerpiece of SSOD II, providing a long-term plan and schedule for future disarmament efforts. Others believe the value of the CPD is limited and that concentration on it is likely to be divisive and to divert attention from specific steps to check and reverse the arms race. A two-track approach could mitigate the need to choose between a CPD and specific disarmament measures. Separate working groups might be set up, one for the CPD and one or more to deal with high-priority measures, many of which will undoubtedly be similar to the earlier stages of a CPD.

If SSOD II can avoid such hazards, it can advance disarmament progress by (1) strengthening the determination and the capability of the world community to accelerate multilateral disarmament progress and (2) emphasizing specific high-priority disarmament measures. SSOD II would make a major contribution in the first area by achieving these objectives.

Commitment

If nations are to give greater attention to arms reduction, greater numbers of knowledgeable governmental leaders must be committed to disarmament. SSOD II needs to provide rational and factual emphasis on the hazards and dangers of the accelerating nuclear and conventional arms races. Such awareness is necessary to develop the sense of urgency required to overcome the lethargy, governmental as well as public, now surrounding disarmament efforts.

The relationship between disarmament and national security and well-being must be clearly developed. Today's massive armament build-ups are justified as being essential to national defense; disarmament measures, therefore, are frequently characterized as antidefense. To answer this charge, disarmament measures need to be properly linked to securi-

ty; the lack of security afforded by greater arsenals needs to be emphasized. The connection between military expenditures and national economies needs to be developed; developing countries must be made more aware of how expanding military forces absorb funds badly needed for economic and social progress. The point must be made that arms reduction is necessary to enable nations and their peoples to have greater security and to achieve their domestic goals.

The disarmament commitment of national leaders depends in part on the pressures and support exerted by a large, visible, and vocal constituency. SSOD II has the potential to enlarge this constituency by raising the visibility and credibility of the disarmament movement. Official participation by even more nations than at SSOD I, and parallel unofficial activities by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will attract media attention. If the general debate by national leaders is tolerably objective and to the point and if the actions of the session are responsible, the resulting publicity should awaken the public, as well as national leaders, to the potential and urgency of disarmament.

Encouragement

SSOD II cannot dictate disarmament action to nation states; it should, however, urge and encourage action in three areas. One area concerns national disarmament organization. Multilateral disarmament efforts will be further enhanced when national organizations and procedures dealing with disarmament are strengthened or created in countries where they do not exist. A study by the Stanley Foundation—*National Disarmament Mechanisms* by L. M. Ross and John R. Redick, July 1980—highlights the importance of such organization.

The second area of encouragement concerns regional multilateral disarmament efforts: NWFZs, zones of peace, and zones of limited conventional weapons. Such emphasis is important because through regional efforts disarmament progress may be achieved independently from bilateral negotiations and global multilateral progress. Encouragement may reactivate support for some of the oft proposed regional agreements.

SSOD II cannot compel the United States and the Soviet Union to resume bilateral negotiations. There is no doubt, however, that early resumption and expansion of bilateral negotiations should and will be strongly urged during general debate and the deliberations at SSOD II.

UN Machinery

While there is no apparent need for additional disarmament machinery, the existing mechanisms of the United Nations should be fine-tuned and improved. Current mechanisms fall into three categories.

Deliberative forums are provided by the regular meetings of the General Assembly, including its First Committee which now deals with disarmament measures, by Special Sessions, and by the UN Disarmament Commission. The work of the General Assembly and its First Committee could be facilitated by reducing the number and repetitious nature of disarmament resolutions. The First Committee might focus on an annual review of disarmament and stimulate action in those areas ripe for progress. The scope of activity of the UN Disarmament Commission deserves attention. The Commission would be more effective if it avoided duplication of work done by the First Committee and focused on a few specific disarmament issues. The desirability of calling a World Disarmament Conference, as another deliberative forum, will be discussed at SSOD II.

Negotiations take place at the CD which is associated with but not actually a part of, the United Nations. Longer sessions with more time spent on negotiations and less time on procedures might increase the CD's output.

The third category relates to service and research bodies; namely, the UN Centre for Disarmament, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies which reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The role of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and its relationship with the Centre for Disarmament deserve clarification. Both of these institutions would produce more if they had larger staffs and greater funding. SSOD II should encourage continued use of expert studies employing the highest caliber international talent, coordinated by the Advisory Board.

Research

To progress toward the goal of a world without war, the world community must break new ground and move far beyond conventional wisdom and experience. Decision makers need all the guidance that can be provided through sound research. More research on all facets of disarmament, including fostering an adequate security system as an alter-

native to current dependence on national military force, is required. It is highly desirable for SSOD II to promote expanded research. In addition to the research function of UN organizations, the United Nations University centered in Tokyo should be encouraged to undertake multidisciplinary research in the areas of conflict management and disarmament.

Because UN resources are limited, the bulk of disarmament research must, of necessity, occur elsewhere. Every nation, especially members of the CD, needs its own research organization. Although NGOs, including research institutes, may be doing more research than are governments, increased research by them is critically needed. Because NGOs are financed by private funds and by contracts with governmental units, they have an independent viewpoint that is useful and an outreach to opinion shapers that is essential.

Multilateral Disarmament Measures

SSOD II's ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament calls for numerous interrelated disarmament measures. Upon which of these measures should current multilateral efforts be focused? Which are most susceptible to early accomplishment? Which will generate the most powerful momentum for the disarmament process? There is no single answer; action in each of several areas is needed. I believe SSOD II should emphasize and designate a number of urgent measures deserving high priority.

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

A soundly structured CPD would develop the relationships among the numerous required disarmament measures and facilitate the selection of priority items for multilateral effort. Adoption of a CPD by the UN General Assembly will not, of itself, assure disarmament; at best it is but a projected progress schedule. Nevertheless, a CPD must be very carefully structured. A CPD would actually harm disarmament efforts if it lacks flexibility or contains unrealistic time schedules. A further hazard is that concentration on a CPD may divert attention from specific steps to check or reverse the arms race; thresholds of opportunity may be passed. The first stage of a CPD including priorities for the next few years, deserves the most time and effort.

A realistic CPD requires parallel progress in strengthen-

ing international mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes and strengthening UN and regional mechanisms for conflict management, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control

Ultimately multilateral disarmament measures limiting and reducing nuclear weapons will be required. Near-term progress, however, depends on the Soviet Union and the United States. Beyond prodding and encouraging the superpowers, multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts should be focused on the nuclear test ban, the nonproliferation regime, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Once the two major nuclear powers check and begin to reverse the nuclear arms race, multilateral efforts to stop the production of fissionable materials and the production and deployment of nuclear weapons will be viable.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

Agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) to supplement the 1963 treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water is broadly regarded as a most important disarmament measure. A CTB would serve not only to restrict the arms race between the major nuclear powers but would strengthen the nonproliferation regime and discourage the development of nuclear weapons by more countries. Negotiations on a CTB by the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain in Geneva are well advanced but current negotiations are at a standstill due to disagreement over the term of the treaty and other matters. Multilateral pressure should be exerted during SSOD II and within the CD to persuade the negotiating nations and other states to resolve their remaining differences and to submit the CTB for adoption and ratification.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The present nonproliferation regime is not preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), brainchild of the Soviet Union and the United States, is in jeopardy. The 1980 NPT Review Conference clearly revealed the dissatisfactions of many nations—parties to the treaty as well as nonparties—with the treaty and with the elements of the nonproliferation regime. Primary concern centers on the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to implement their Article VI commitment to get on with the tasks of ending the nuclear arms race and

developing a treaty for general and complete disarmament. A second major concern relates to the viability of Article IV provisions regarding access to nuclear technology, equipment, and fuel for peaceful uses.

Multilateral initiatives are needed to create a regime capable of limiting proliferation. Participants at "Nonproliferation: 1980s," a Vantage Conference sponsored by the Stanley Foundation in January 1980, considered the elements of an effective nonproliferation regime. Early reduction of the number of nuclear weapons held by the Soviet Union and the United States would be extremely beneficial. Other desirable measures are:

—A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
—Assurance of an uninterrupted supply of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful uses to NPT parties.
—More effective safeguards administered by the IAEA.
—Negative security assurances whereby nuclear-weapon states would guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear weapon state.

Many of the participants believed that international or multinational management or control of some parts of the nuclear fuel cycle would be helpful in achieving the twin objectives of expanding access to nuclear energy while assuring adequate nonproliferation safeguards.

Such measures would strengthen the nonproliferation regime and attract the support of nations now tempted to develop nuclear weapons. Development of additional NWFZs would advance the nonproliferation regime.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Multilateral action is needed to strengthen the operations and expand the responsibilities of the IAEA both in the peaceful uses and the nonproliferation aspects of nuclear energy. Existing and potential nonproliferation roles for the IAEA fall into three categories. Full scope safeguards pertaining to the use and transfer of nuclear materials are increasingly important. This program must grow in size and funding as more reactors and other nuclear facilities are put into service. The developing criticism of the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards was highlighted by the Israeli attack on the Iraqi power reactor. IAEA safeguards are intended to detect violation of safeguards after they have occurred and to sound

warnings; currently these safeguards incorporate no enforcement mechanism or authority. The IAEA should be encouraged to accelerate development of procedures and mechanisms to improve speed, accuracy, and reliability of its safeguards. The IAEA's staff and funding need to be enlarged.

A developing role for IAEA concerns assurance of the supply of nuclear technology, equipment, and materials for peaceful uses to NPT parties. The IAEA has established a Committee on Assurance of Supply reporting to its Board of Governors.

A future role for the agency may be to safeguard, manage, or administer the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle such as plutonium management and spent fuel storage—perhaps involving regional or subregional nuclear centers.

Treaties

Two treaties now under consideration by the CD are sufficiently advanced to warrant continuing multilateral effort to push for their adoption. Considerable progress has been achieved on a treaty banning chemical weapons, but agreement is snagged on questions of verification because of Soviet and US disagreements.

The treaty on radiological weapons, based on a joint draft presented by the United States and the Soviet Union would prohibit an as yet undeveloped weapon system before the technology is perfected. The CD and its ad hoc working groups should be given more responsibility and a broader mandate to accelerate consideration of these treaties.

Conventional Arms Reduction

The scoreboard for conventional weapons reduction is blank—no successes and very little effort. The wisdom of the day relegates conventional disarmament to secondary consideration on the assumption that once the nuclear threat is contained, reduction of conventional weapons and forces will be in order and will be easily accomplished. This attitude is deep seated and paradoxical. Conventional arms and forces account for 80-85 percent of global military expenditures; 100 percent in nonnuclear-weapon states. Only conventional weapons have been used in the wars that have occurred since World War II. All nations would gain economically and security-wise by lessening the competitive

pressures to enlarge conventional forces and acquire evermore sophisticated and costly planes, tanks, and other weapons.

Vigorous multilateral activity to halt and reverse the conventional arms race warrants high priority. Such activity would improve the disarmament climate by (1) involving more nations, (2) making active disarmament activities more comprehensive, that is, conventional as well as nuclear, and (3) giving greater visibility and credibility to the disarmament movement.

Reducing the transfer of conventional weapons is one area deserving prompt and vigorous multilateral effort. Arms transfers could be controlled and reduced by (1) a supplier nation agreement to ban or limit arms transfers to certain types or to certain areas, (2) a recipient nation agreement on a regional basis to ban import of certain types of sophisticated offensive weapons or to place limits on aggregate imports, or (3) a worldwide treaty prohibiting transfers of specific types of weapons or limiting aggregate transfers to any nation according to a suitable formula that considers factors such as population, area, and length of borders. To be credible, all of these alternatives will require an adequate verification system. Reporting arms transfers to the United Nations would be a useful first step to shed light on the magnitude of the transfer problem and to aid in the development of a verification system.

Measures to reduce conventional armaments and forces is the second area of needed activity. Agreement might be sought among participating nations to forego the deployment and use of certain sophisticated and costly weapons and to undertake balanced and phased reduction of conventional armaments and forces to levels consistent with internal security needs. Both would require dependable verification. Verifiable programs for reducing military budgets could be a useful step.

Outer Space

Further measures to prevent the weaponization of outer space are needed, and needed soon, lest technology ushers in space warfare. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits weapons of mass destruction—presumably nuclear weapons—from being placed in fixed orbit; it does not prohibit other types of space weapons now under development by

the Soviet Union and the United States. A few years ago US and Soviet technical experts discussed banning antisatellite weapons, but these talks are now dormant. In 1981, the Soviet Union proposed to the UN General Assembly a treaty banning weaponization of outer space: A group of eight western nations—not including the United States—urged the CD at its 1982 session to negotiate an effective and ratifiable agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space. Initiatives to develop either a new treaty or an amendment to the existing outer space treaty are in order. A first step might be an antisatellite agreement prohibiting attacks on satellites and restricting the testing and development of antisatellite weapons. While this would temporarily defuse a situation that is both immediate and highly destabilizing, further attention should be given to banning armed space stations, weapons in fixed orbit, and ground based laser or particle beam weapons. Multilateral efforts in the CD and elsewhere to prevent weaponization of outer space should receive high priority attention.

Regional Arrangements

The development of agreements to ban or limit armaments in defined areas holds considerable promise. NWFZs have been proposed for the Middle East, the Nordic area, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Despite the complications and difficulties of achieving agreement among the nations within each of these areas, the benefits of NWFZs are sufficient to warrant concentrated efforts. Removal of the nuclear threat would enhance security and improve the climate for disarmament.

As previously mentioned, early limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and forces is most likely to occur on a regional rather than a global basis. Zones of peace to limit indigenous military forces and the activities of external states have been suggested for the Mediterranean area and Southeast Asia, in addition to the Indian Ocean. Regional limitation of the development and transfer of conventional weapons along the lines of the preliminary efforts undertaken in the Declaration of Ayacucho holds promise. In Southeast Asia this approach would be consistent with the expressed intent of the five nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to neutralize their area. Many other regions would benefit from this approach.

Confidence-Building Measures

There are significant opportunities for implementation of multilateral confidence-building measures. Measures that insure compliance with and verification of arms limitation and reduction agreements are of greatest importance. Verification has been a common hang up on bilateral as well as multilateral negotiations.

Serious consideration should be given to proposals to establish UN and regional verification capability, for example, the creation of a UN satellite verification system or the establishment of a verification unit within the UN Centre for Disarmament. The acceptance of meaningful arms reduction measures will inevitably hinge on the confidence nations have in the verification processes.

Other confidence-building measures worthy of consideration include: advance notification of military maneuvers; observation of these events; exchange of information on levels of weapons, forces, and military budgets; and regular periodic and private consultations.

Other Approaches

The traditional pattern for disarmament progress, formal negotiation and ratification of treaties and conventions, is so slow and laborious that technology development and weapons deployment outpace it by a wide margin. Because early breakthroughs and successes would improve the climate for disarmament, I urge consideration of ways to break away from the conventional approach and thus avoid some of its frustrations. Some alternatives to the traditional pattern are:

—Development of nonbinding norms or codes in the areas of arms races and security to facilitate subsequent treaty negotiations or to serve as guidelines for national conduct.
—Voluntary acceptance of informal restraints related to nonbinding norms or codes or to unratified treaties.
—Agreed short-term moratoriums such as were used in negotiating the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.
—Independent initiatives undertaken by one nation or a group of nations in the expectation of reciprocal action.

These alternatives could be applied multilaterally as well as bilaterally. Perhaps there are other alternatives of greater

promise. Even though it may seem a long shot, innovative consideration of alternatives might speed the pathetically slow progress of disarmament.

Obstacles

Multilateral, as well as bilateral, disarmament efforts falter and fail for a simple reason: lack of national will. If enough national leaders were genuinely determined to make disarmament progress, they would succeed and they would gain the support of their publics. Based on numerous one-to-one discussions with national leaders I have every reason to believe that with rare exception they sincerely desire peace and decry war, but most believe burgeoning military establishments are necessary for national defense. Too few are farsighted enough to see that armament reduction is a vital step to assure peace and security to our troubled world. Most national leaders, doubting that meaningful arms reduction is achievable in the foreseeable future, are reluctant to deal seriously with disarmament issues. The result is rhetoric, posturing, and documentation rather than arms reduction.

Before national leaders are likely to make a strong commitment to disarmament, age-old traditions must be overcome, myths regarding security must be debunked, strong pressures of vested interests must be resisted, and stronger constituencies supporting disarmament must be developed.

Tradition

Long before the emergence of nation states, military might superior to that of perceived enemies was considered the basis for security. Throughout history, military power has been viewed as the only force that will be respected; alliances and power balances have been structured to preserve the status quo; military threats have been used as normal supports to diplomacy; and as a last resort, war has been the accepted device to settle controversy between nations. Caught in this hoary tradition, most national leaders feel a deep sense of personal responsibility to assure their nation's security by maintaining a strong military establishment. This tradition is not limited to powerful nations like the United States and the Soviet Union; even poverty-stricken Third World countries follow it. Nor is this attitude limited to governmental officials; broad segments of the public sincerely believe that greater military power is the surest path to peace and security.

Disarmament will not receive the attention it deserves until nations break the shackles imposed by the historic dependence on military might for security. Such a break is long overdue. The question then is how to shatter this tradition and fashion an alternative security system. Debunking some of the twentieth century security myths and resisting the pressures of vested interests are two parts of the answer.

Myths

One widely circulated myth concerning security and disarmament is that war is inevitable. There have always been wars, humans are inherently belligerent, nations are basically aggressive—excepting, of course, one's own country—therefore, why expect anything but more war, even nuclear war?

Wars are human-made. Whatever the controversies, hatreds, fears, or differences among nations, wars occur because national leaders start them or allow them to escalate from border skirmishes or other incidents. Wars between nations will continue to be normal and accepted events as long as the world community sanctions the use of armed force as the ultimate tool of foreign policy. Wars will continue until nations require the use of other methods to settle controversies and deter aggression.

A second dangerous myth is that a nuclear war is winnable, that nuclear weapons are just like any other weapons systems at the disposal of the military. Any doubt that I might have had about nuclear weapons was resolved by my visit in 1963 to the Hiroshima Museum which contains the relics of the first atom bomb explosion. I also visted a hospital that was full of pathetic, suffering victims of radiation exposure. All that waste and destruction was from a primitive fifteen kiloton bomb. A modern one megaton strategic nuclear warhead packs explosive power and potential devastation some 700 times greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Every military officer and civilian official who glibly considers a nuclear warhead just another weapon should be required to visit Hiroshima. A major nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States would kill 50 to 100 million people in each country; lay waste to cities, communications, and transportation systems; and poison vast areas with radiation. Who could be a winner? What a victory. Hold no false hope that once started by a few tactical nuclear shots or a limited strategic strike on

a selected target nuclear war can be controlled or halted. Once started, escalation to holocaust is almost assured.

A third dangerous myth widely held by opinion shapers and decision makers is that more and more weapons and larger and larger military forces assure national security. This concept spurs the arms races, not only between nuclear powers, but also among many other nations around the globe who rely only on conventional armaments. All nations endeavor to keep up with or move a little ahead of perceived adversaries. Their military build-ups called defense are counted on to deter the adversary from starting a war. The truth is that overarmed nations do not feel secure, despite a constant build-up of evermore destructive and sophisticated weapons and forces. The United States, for example, with its huge warchest of nuclear bombs, has embarked on a massive expansion of military power. Why? Because according to the Reagan administration, the United States is not secure. Massive military forces do not guarantee security. On the contrary, over-dependence on military power fosters a tendency to seek military answers to international problems. Misled by an adversary, such action can precipitate conflict. Rather than providing national security, today's arms races pose the threat of monumental catastrophe.

Disarmament progress is handicapped by these and related myths which are all too readily accepted. Knowledge and understanding are the appropriate instruments to reduce and overcome the harmful effects of these myths. Information about the nature of nuclear war and the resulting casualties and devastation must be more widely disseminated. The effects of war and the constant preparation for it upon national economies and lifestyles need to be presented frankly and openly. The contentions of governmental and military leaders who support these myths must be challenged.

Pressures

Why do these traditions and myths persist? To a large degree, they are kept alive by the strong and vocal insistence of vested interests. The military industrial complex—the one President Eisenhower warned about, albeit vastly enlarged—exerts strong, well-financed pressure on governments and the public.

The military hierarchy is a primary source of pressure. Career officers benefit from an expanding, not a contracting,

military establishment. In addition, most military officers have a philosophic approach to security that impedes objective consideration of disarmament. Military minds, with few exceptions, assume the worst possible set of threats, develop elaborate strategies to meet them, add safety factors, and accordingly call for money to provide arms. This may be the proper way to prepare for war, but it is a poor approach to arms reduction. Dominant military influence, as it exists in the United States and the Soviet Union, discourages civilian leaders from objectively considering disarmament proposals and overshadows the important political, economic, humanitarian, and moral factors of security.

Pressure is exerted too by the sheer momentum of the defense system. Since World War II, the development and manufacture of conventional and nuclear arms have been amply funded and warmly encouraged. The result is an extensive and intricate organism with a life force of its own. It embraces scientists, researchers, manufacturers, managers, workers, and governmental decision makers, and has strong vocal support from many patriotic organizations. The rare political leader who sincerely endeavors to make disarmament progress is thwarted by the inertia and pressures of this massive complex and by the deliberate or inadvertent resistance of its managers.

The undue pressure of the military industrial complex could be mitigated by a better informed disarmament constituency capable of countering the pressures of the military industrial complex and by national governmental disarmament organizations structured to reduce the influence and pressure of the military industrial complex while increasing the influence of disarmament advocates.

Limited Approach

The reluctance of many national leaders to give disarmament a high priority could partially be overcome by a more comprehensive approach to national security. The world community needs an alternative security system. The three components of the new system must be (1) disarmament, (2) an effective system for peacefully settling the controversies that inevitably arise among nations and their nationals, and (3) international mechanisms to manage conflict—to deter imminent aggression and to deal with breaches of the peace.

Nations will more readily agree to substantial disarma-

ment if simultaneous progress is made in the other two areas. Together disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes, and conflict management constitute a security system far better suited to the nuclear age and the last quarter of the twentieth century than the traditional reliance on military power. The relationship of these three elements is generally recognized in disarmament documents, including the SSOD I Final Document, but adequate emphasis and determined effort to simultaneously progress in all three areas is usually lacking.

Disarmament progress could be accelerated by parallel efforts to improve the world's mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict management. There is much to build upon: the International Court of Justice; the authorities given the Security Council by the UN Charter; and the several regional organizations, for example, the European Economic Community, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity. (For a fuller discussion, refer to *Managing Global Problems*, C. Maxwell Stanley, The Stanley Foundation, 1979, pp. 189-203.) Matching every serious and dedicated disarmament advocate with an equally serious and determined advocate of peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict management would stimulate disarmament progress.

Low Priority

The very low priority many national leaders assign disarmament is a severe handicap. Domestic issues—the economy, unemployment, inflation, public works, and social issues—tend to dominate the thinking and action of politicians because they are close at hand and more susceptible to prompt action. International issues, particularly disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes, and conflict management, seem further removed and easily deferred; progress seems unlikely because so many nations are involved.

Yet failure to cope with disarmament places a tremendous economic burden on every nation caught in an arms race. Military establishments have enormous and seldom satisfied appetites for funds. Witness President Reagan's request to spend $1.6 trillion on defense in fiscal years 1982 through 1986. Large national military expenditures inevitably cause immediate financial and budgetary strains leading to deficit financing, nonmilitary program reductions, tax increases, or some combination thereof. Disarmament, as a partial solu-

tion to domestic economic problems, deserves a higher priority.

Near-term financial burdens and economic problems may be the least of the evils inherent in titanic military establishments. Arms races divert vast commitments of human resources, technology, and leadership from other critical domestic and global needs: economic and social development, employment, poverty eradication, energy research and supply, and environmental protection to mention a few. It is most difficult if not impossible for a nation to adequately meet the real needs of its people when it devotes its best minds and a huge share of its budget to the creation of new and better means of destruction. The result in country after country is neglect, deferment, or only token attention to issues seriously affecting national well-being.

Another unfavorable result of over-emphasis on military power is neglect of important economic and political elements of security. This is particularly true in the United States. A strong and viable economy is the essential foundation of its national power, influence, and security. Therefore, much greater attention should be given to avoiding unfavorable balances of payment, expanding exports to the Third World, assuring dependable sources of oil and other imported resources, and striving with other nations to strengthen the world's monetary, trade, and transnational enterprise systems. Strong political relations with the rest of the world and especially with allies and nonaligned nations are important to better manage the serious global issues which require political action and diplomacy largely conducted through international organizations. These political and economic elements are downgraded when security depends too greatly upon military might. Moreover, there is an undue tendency to use military approaches to deal with economic and political problems—to rattle the sabers.

What can be done to encourage national leaders to give the desired priority and attention to disarmament matters? They must be made aware of how much their countries would benefit from the human resources, money, and leadership that disarmament would release for other needs. Coupled with a greater awareness of the hazards and uncertainties of continued reliance on military force, attitudes could change. This calls for study and research, both governmental and private, together with a strong disarmament constituency and an effective national disarmament organization.

Lack of Disarmament Organizations

The importance of effective international disarmament machinery has been emphasized. Effective disarmament organization at the national level is even more important. It is the catalyst needed to stimulate the will and determination of national leaders to give disarmament a higher priority. Without the will and determination of many nations, the international machinery of the United Nations will accomplish little.

By disarmament organization, I mean the governmental agencies, departments, and units which handle disarmament matters and the relationship of these bodies to the country's decision-making process. While the functions of national disarmament organization will vary from nation to nation, certain basic operations are important:

1. Gathering data and literature regarding disarmament.
2. Analyzing the numerous disarmament proposals.
3. Developing recommendations for policy considerations.
4. Participating in the decision-making process.
5. Providing competent and informed persons to represent the nation in disarmament forums and negotiations.

Nations with a strong commitment to disarmament, particularly the larger ones, may also add a research function. Dissemination of information concerning disarmament within the national government, as well as to the public, is another highly desirable function.

The role of the nation's disarmament organization in the decision-making process is of great importance. The organization needs to be positioned in the governmental hierarchy in a way that assures credible stature and ready access to the top decision makers. Although disarmament issues will be considered in conjunction with other national problems, the disarmament organization needs to be freed of domination by governmental departments, particularly the military. The independence of the organization will be more likely if staffing includes nonmilitary officials who are competent and independent; the organization must be capable of challenging the military appraisal of the threats to the country and its strategies to meet them.

The Stanley Foundation study of national disarmament mechanisms (previously cited) revealed that relatively few national governments have an adequate organization to deal with disarmament issues and that many handle disarmament matters on an ad hoc basis by temporarily assigning diplomats, generals, or admirals. Only a few of the larger nations now have organizations capable of helping their governments make objective decisions about disarmament policy. As a consequence, many diplomats participating in multilateral forums are handicapped by lack of understanding and direction regarding the disarmament measures under consideration.

The participants at the Stanley Foundation's 1981 United Nations of the Next Decade Conference titled "The Multilateral Disarmament Process" agreed that governmental agencies dealing with disarmament should be strengthened or created in countries which do not now have them. Certainly national disarmament organizations are essential for the 40 member nations of the CD. Even the smallest nation desiring to participate actively in multilateral disarmament efforts needs its own disarmament organization, however small it may be.

The following guidelines would be helpful in creating or strengthening national disarmament organizations:

1. Structure the organization to report to high officials, the minister of foreign affairs if not the country's chief executive.
2. Assure independence from undue military influence.
3. Staff with full-time professionals.
4. Integrate a disarmament perspective into national policy formation and decision-making.
5. Assure regular legislative input into the disarmament negotiations and policy formation.
6. Undertake disarmament research.
7. Disseminate disarmament information within governmental circles and to the public.

A well structured and adequately staffed disarmament

organization, however, is only a part of the system needed to raise the priority of disarmament matters. Strong, motivated, and well-informed public support of disarmament is also required.

Inadequate Constituency

Disarmament is much too important to be left solely to elected or self-appointed governmental leaders. Governmental leaders are more likely to develop the requisite will and determination to make disarmament progress if urged and supported by a broad disarmament constituency. Unfortunately, the current worldwide constituency supporting disarmament is grossly inadequate.

The potential constituency includes all who believe security in the nuclear age calls for disarmament and all who would benefit from disarmament, in both public and private sectors of all countries. Special efforts are needed to reach political and military decision makers and professional diplomats and to encourage them to use their influence and skills in the disarmament effort. Special efforts are also needed to reach opinion shapers in the private sector and encourage them to help mold broader public support for disarmament.

A substantial increase in education and accurate, credible information on disarmament is needed. This should be done through all available channels: governments, news media, universities, schools, and NGOs. Disarmament issues should be presented in ways that show concern for the problems of various groups. For example, taxpayers should be shown the relationship of disarmament to economic and social development and lowered taxes; governmental officials should be shown how disarmament would solve security problems by reducing both the cost and the risk of war.

NGOs and research institutes can make important contributions to building a constituency. Many professions, doctors, scientists, lawyers, and musicians, to name a few, are forming groups to work for disarmament or to expose the real hazards of nuclear weapons. These groups need the information and coordination of activities which research groups and NGOs can provide. NGOs and these ad hoc grass roots groups should be encouraged to make long-term commitments of support for ongoing disarmament progress rather than just short-term advocacy of a specific treaty or event.

Lack of Leadership

Without vigorous and enlightened leadership there will be little reduction of national armaments. The inevitable periodic outbursts of rhetoric, however inspired and intelligent, are not enough. The leaders of more nations must accord disarmament a higher priority. Dedicated leadership should logically come from those nations which would receive the greatest security and economic benefits from a reversal of the arms race. Using this criteria, the United States and the Soviet Union should be in the forefront, but they are not. Instead, they are the prime culprits in the insane, inhuman, and criminal race to gain security by piling up stores of nuclear weapons capable of devastating civilization. By example and by export of weapons, they compound their folly by stimulating conventional arms races around the globe.

Were the Soviet Union and the United States to moderate their polemics, reactivate bilateral negotiations on strategic arms reduction, and participate seriously in SSOD II and similar activities, the multilateral disarmament movement would benefit greatly. Hence the importance of demanding these two nations to rise above their political and ideological differences, and to provide the leadership the world expects from major powers.

Until this occurs, the leadership of the multilateral movement will continue to come from a group of mostly nonaligned nations. The commitment of other nations, including some from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would significantly strengthen this coalition. What is likely to motivate more leaders to commit their countries to leadership in disarmament efforts? Nothing less, I believe, than an enlightened realization that war is obsolete and that the uncontrolled arms race is a greater threat to peace and security than any threat posed by a perceived adversary, whatever its ideology.

National leaders who would enhance their country's long-range as well as near-term security have a heavy responsibility. They must not be allowed to escape their responsibility to rise above traditions, myths, and pressures and to objectively appraise the mounting hazard of the unchecked arms race. A well-structured national disarmament organization staffed with able people tolerably independent of the pressures of vested interests can provide valuable assistance. In the final analysis, however, the responsibility rests with the senior governmental officials.

In open societies, private sector activities can help to motivate governmental leaders. A broad, vigorous, and well-informed disarmament constituency can influence the media and other opinion shapers and create pressures on elected and appointed officials, thus offsetting the influence of vested interests. NGOs of various types can inspire and inform the disarmament constituency and through research, publications, and discussion provide input to governmental officials, including those involved in national disarmament organizations.

While national leadership usually involves the composite efforts of many officials and agencies, personal leadership of able and dedicated individuals is important on both the international and national levels. The dogged persistence of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico is credited with perfecting the Tlatelolco Treaty; he also rallied delegates in the closing hours of SSOD I to perfect the Final Document. Arvid Pardo, former ambassador of tiny Malta, almost singlehandedly promoted the UN decision to reexamine the Law of the Sea. Paul Hoffman, as a member of the UN staff, years ago brought new concepts and strengths to multilateral aid programs. The disarmament movement would benefit from more leadership by farsighted individuals such as these.

The vitality and impact of disarmament constituencies in open societies will depend greatly on the individuals who lead the research institutes, the NGOs, and ad hoc grass roots movements. A strong private sector disarmament constituency also requires great numbers of followers who will join disarmament organizations and movements.

The emergence of stronger leadership should not be left to chance. Effective governmental and private research focused on long-range disarmament issues could help to motivate national leaders. Most nations would benefit (1) from internal restructuring of their organizations and procedures to deal with multilateral disarmament; (2) from assigning able and forward-looking diplomats and other professionals to responsible positions dealing with disarmament issues; and, (3) from seeking the services of disarmament oriented private citizens and representatives of NGOs.

General disarmament progress will occur only when nation states act collectively to make it happen. Collective action by

nation states will occur only when the leaders of many nations accept the responsibility to give disarmament top priority. National leaders must be inspired, persuaded, or goaded to lead their nations into vigorous disarmament activity, into joining a conspiracy for common sense.

Conclusion

Disarmament will come. Reliance on the threat and use of massive military power will diminish. Adequate mechanisms to peacefully resolve controversies among nations and to manage conflict will evolve. I believe these happenings are inevitable unless the human race exterminates itself first.

The critical question is not *if* but rather *when and how* the world will disarm. Must meaningful disarmament await a catastrophe, a serious nuclear accident, further war, a narrow brush with nuclear war, or other international events of tragic proportion? Or will decision makers respond to reason, to moral imperatives, and to the people's deep desire for peace?

Who knows? The near-term outlook offers little hope that reason and logic will soon prevail. Neither SSOD II nor other multilateral disarmament efforts are likely to quickly produce a major disarmament breakthrough. The paranoia dominating US-Soviet relations shows no signs of early abatement. Intense nationalism blinds governments to their common interests and handicaps the efforts of the few far-seeing and courageous national leaders now directing the disarmament efforts. The prevailing attitude of the public, including most opinion shapers, reflects disinterest, frustration, and a sense of powerlessness; nuclear and disarmament issues are too complex, let the government handle them.

Yet there are hopeful signs. Economic pressures to reduce military expenditures are mounting. Even prosperous nations find they cannot restrain or lower taxes and cut budget deficits without trimming military outlays. Less prosperous nations face even more desperate choices. Undoubtedly, the financial pinch will compel nation after nation to face up to the questions of "guns or butter."

A second hopeful omen is the growing realization of what technology has wrought—mind-boggling weapons which,

if used, would ravage modern civilization and threaten human survival. More people are thinking, talking, and writing about the unthinkable. This disparate group of concerned citizens includes a number of prominent educational, professional, and religious leaders, a few business and labor leaders, and an occasional public official. Their voices join those of the organizations and individuals who have long sought to speed the disarmament process.

The most encouraging sign, however, is the sudden rise of public sector protest and opposition to preparations for nuclear war which are occurring in Europe, Japan, and the United States. In the United States, Physicians for Social Responsibility, The Union of Concerned Scientists, Business Executives Move for New National Priorities, Ground Zero, and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign are some of the groups active in the movement. These grass roots efforts are beginning to challenge the Reagan administration's call for expansion of US military power, particularly nuclear weapon power.

Slowly a larger and broader disarmament constituency is forming. New faces and new voices are joining with the old disarmament hands to urge and press national leaders to stop, look, and listen before the momentum of the arms race overwhelms us all. Thus, like-minded, concerned citizens are banding together in a loose conspiracy to challenge government. The conspiracy, overt rather than covert, welcomes and encourages others to join in the common sense quest for disarmament—an essential step toward a world without war.

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The time has come for disarmament. The traditional practice of threatening and using military might is obsolete. In this paper C. Maxwell Stanley outlines the danger of continuing the conventional and nuclear arms races and offers alternatives to ensure both peace and security.

Special attention is given to the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II). Mr. Stanley explores the opportunities and the hazards facing SSOD II and offers specific recommendations to stimulate progress.

The paper examines multilateral disarmament efforts, both global and regional, citing accomplishments, potential, and major obstacles. Emphasis is placed on the need to develop national will and leadership to carry the disarmament movement forward.

Mr. Stanley challenges everyone—national leaders, opinion shapers, and citizens—to work for disarmament, to join "a conspiracy for common sense."

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